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ABSTRACT:
A Principle of Subsidiarity regulates the allocation and/or use of authority within a
political order where authority is dispersed between a centre and various sub-units.
Section 1 sketches the role of such principle of subsidiarity in the EU,and some of its signi-
ficance in Canada. Section 2 presents some conceptions of subsidiarity that indicate the
range of alternatives. Section 3 considers some areas where such conceptions might add
value to constitutional and political deliberations in Canada. Section 4 concludes with
some reminders of crucial contested issues not fully resolved by appeals to subsidiarity
alone, exemplified by the protection of human rights.
RÉSUMÉ :
Un principe de subsidiarité réglemente la répartition et/ou l’usage de l’autorité au sein
d’un ordre politique où l’autorité est dispersée entre un centre et des sous-unités variées.
La section 1 de cet articlemontre le rôle d’un tel principe de subsidiarité dans l’Union euro-
péenne, et certaines de ses implications au Canada. La section 2 présente des conceptions
de la subsidiarité qui indiquent un éventail d’alternatives. La section 3 considère certains
domaines où de telles conceptions pourraient ajouter de la valeur aux délibérations
constitutionnelles et politiques au Canada. La section 4 conclut en rappelant certains
problèmes cruciaux contestés, non entièrement résolus par les seuls appels à la subsi-
diarité, exemplifiés par la protection des droits humains.
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APrinciple of Subsidiarity regulates the allocation and/or use of authority within
a political order where authority is dispersed between a centre and various sub-
units. The principle places the burden of argument on those who seek to central-
ize such authority. In the EU, the principle has risen to prominence due to
inclusion in several treaties. In Canada, arguments reminiscent of ‘subsidiarity’
appear to underpin the Supreme Court of Canada’s ‘provincial inability test’ to
interpret the extent of federal jurisdiction under section 91 of the 1867 Consti-
tution Act,1 and the principle has been expressly invoked on several occasions
on different subject matters.2
Such comparisons between political orders with federal elements should only be
done with great caution. One main reason for modesty when comparing the EU
and Canada is that they exhibit features, strengths, and weaknesses from two
different models of federation.3 A ‘coming together’ federation emerges from
independent states that agree to pool sovereign powers in certain areas to better
achieve certain objectives. In contrast, a ‘holding together’ federation has
emerged from a somewhat unified state in order to secure a different objective—
namely, the survival of the state by quelling secessionist threats: delegating
contentious issues such as language, religious holidays, etc. to the contesting
groups rather than insisting on common policies. The EU has several features of
‘coming together’ federations among fully sovereign states, while Canada’s
constitutional and legal arrangements also result from attempts at ‘holding
together’ the various provinces.
This cautionary note notwithstanding, Section 1 sketches the role of a principle
of subsidiarity in the EU and some of its significance in Canada. In order to
determine the relevance and value of subsidiarity in the Canadian setting,
Section 2 presents some conceptions of subsidiarity that indicate the range of
alternatives beyond those chosen by the EU. Section 3 considers some areas
where such conceptions might add value to constitutional and political deliber-
ations in Canada. Section 4 concludes with some reminders of crucial contested
issues not fully resolved by appeals to subsidiarity alone, exemplified by the
protection of human rights.
1. SUBSIDIARITY—IN THE EU AND IN CANADA
Several Treaties in the EU include a principle of subsidiarity. In the latest
version, the Lisbon Treaty, the Subsidiarity Principle requires that:
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”4
Such claims must be supported by reasons given in public.
A mechanism that further illustrate the workings of this Lisbon Subsidiarity
merit mention. The Lisbon Treaty established a new procedure of parliamentary
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review of proposed EU legislation (Protocol,Art 8). This procedure gives power
to national parliaments to monitor proposals and to appeal them—to give out a
“yellow card”—if they think the decision violates subsidiarity.
In Canada, the federal government may
make laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in
relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by
this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
The Supreme Court has interpreted this in part as a question of whether the
provincial governments are able to address the issues of “Peace, Order and good
Government.” Call this Canadian subsidiarity. Decisions to centralize may turn
on whether decisions made by one province impact on other provinces unduly,
or whether federal rather than provincial action has comparative advantages,
similar to the EU. The presumption is thus that decisions should be taken at the
territorially lower level, and the burden of argument falls on those who seek
central action. Several crucial issues either are determined in these treaties and
constitutions or remain underspecified. To bring out the choices made, as well
as the prospects for contestation, it is helpful to consider several partially
conflicting theories of subsidiarity.
2. TRADITIONS OF SUBSIDIARITY
Proponents of subsidiarity have often ignored that this principle has several
different historical traditions with drastically different implications for resolving
conflicts between the centre and the member units—as those that arise regard-
ing human rights. The following explores the implications of three central issues
of contestation among theories of subsidiarity: (a) the immunity of smaller units,
or rather, the obligations of larger units to assist; (b) the ambiguity as to the
fundamental units—whether they are states or individuals; c) the question of
who should have authority to specify the objectives and interests to be protected
and promoted—and indeed to decide whether the principle of subsidiarity
permits or requires more centralized action.
To get a better grasp of the specific features of Lisbon subsidiarity and Canadian
subsidiarity, consider five alternative theories of subsidiarity, each of which has
different implications both for authority above the state and for the allocation of
authority about who should apply the principle of subsidiarity.5
I shall suggest that Lisbon subsidiarity grants undue privileges to the state and
its interests, as we see when we compare to the various traditions from which this
principle is drawn. On the other hand, Canadian subsidiarity seems restrained in
the reasons for centralization consistent with subsidiarity. The five accounts draw
on insights fromAlthusius, the American Confederalists, economic federalism,
Catholic personalism, and liberal contractualism, respectively. They are sketched
in an order that roughly grants the member units less authority. These accounts
may regard subsidiarity as proscribing or prescribing central intervention, and
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apply subsidiarity to the allocation of political powers or to their exercise. Some
of these features reduce the scope of member unit authority, while some may
protect them against intervention. Several of them seek precisely to reduce the
need for general agreement among different world views or preference profiles,
supporting the ‘holding together’ federal elements found, for example, in
Canada.
(A) LIBERTY: ALTHUSIUS
Althusius, the so-called father of federalism, sketched an embryonic theory of
subsidiarity drawing on Orthodox Calvinism. Communities are important
supports (‘subsidia’) for the needs of individuals. Political authority arises on the
basis of covenants among such associations. The role of the resultant centralized
state is to co-ordinate and secure symbiosis among these associations on a
consensual basis: “explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of what-
ever is useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life” (Althu-
sius, 1995, chap. 28). Althusius recognized that deliberation will not always
yield agreement, particularly not in matters of faith. In such cases, he counselled
religious toleration: “the magistrate who is not able, without peril to the
commonwealth, to change or overcome the discrepancy in religion and creed
ought to tolerate the dissenters for the sake of public peace and tranquillity, blink-
ing his eyes and permitting them to exercise unapproved religion” (Althusius,
1995, chap. 28). This interpretation of subsidiarity would appear to take the
existing sub-units for granted—a feature it shares with Lisbon subsidiarity. A
weakness is thus that this approach fails to identify standards for legitimate asso-
ciations regarding their treatment of members, their proper scope of activity, and
their legal powers. Perhaps appeal might be made at this point to the value of
freedom as absence of state constraint—this is indeed part of Althusius’s argu-
ment for associations. But the grounds and scope of this paramount interest in
non-intervention remain to be identified. The Althusian theory of subsidiarity
might allow some conditions on legitimate subunits and on standards for power
allocation among subunits, but such restrictions are not readily apparent.
This concern is perhaps most vividly underscored by the fact that the South
African practice of apartheid and separation into so-called homelands was long
regarded as justified precisely by this tradition of subsidiarity, of “sovereignty
in one’s social circle” (Kuyper, 1880; de Klerk, 1975, pp. 255-260). The South
African model did show the influence of the Dutch pluralist tradition of pillar-
ization, a system of social organization (inspired by Kuyper) in which distinct
cultural or religious groups in a country control their own separate institutions.
This tradition traces its origins to the same sources as Althusian subsidiarity
(Baskwell, 2006). But the South African case demonstrated perversities that
show some of the limitations of subsidiarity as a principle. But the segregation
of the black SouthAfrican population was not voluntary (as Kuyper would have
it). Rather than taking subunits for granted and allocating competencies among
them, the apartheid system created subunits on the pretense of subsidiary allo-
cation of power. It is of course not clear that the role of subsidiarity should be
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to determine the boundaries of units, rather than to be limited to allocating power
between pre-existing units. And the homelands, of course, did not support, but
rather inhibited the needs of individuals within them, thus perverting the idea of
subsidia.
A second characteristic of Althusian subsidiarity is that, on this view, the
common good of a political order is limited to such immunities and to those
undertakings deemed by every subunit to be of their interest compared to their
status quo. While this account allows for negotiation among subunit represen-
tatives based on existing preferences, agreement on ends is not expected—which
is why subsidiarity is required in the first place.
Thirdly, Althusian subsidiarity is strongly committed to immunity of the local
unit from interference by more central authorities. This raises severe problems
when some subunits—associations or states—lack normative legitimacy, and
insofar as interstate inequities raise issues of distributive justice, as in both the
EU and in Canada. This point also brings attention to the so-called inability
clause of Canadian subsidiarity: what should the central authorities do if one or
more provinces are able but unwilling to act so as to secure the requisite objec-
tives?
(B) LIBERTY: CONFEDERALISTS
Similar conclusions emerge from confederal arguments for subsidiarity based on
the fear of tyranny, known from the US Federalist debates. On this view, indi-
viduals should be free to choose in matters where no others are harmed. This is
thought to be best secured by decentralized government enjoying, as on the
Althusian account, veto powers. Thus subunits may veto decisions, or super-
majoritarian mechanisms must be established.An added reason for local politics
often found in this tradition is that participation—and possibly subsidiarity—
might be thought to facilitate learning and to secure political virtue.
Some limitations of this view should be mentioned. Firstly, it seems to assume
a conception of the common good only as mutual advantage, leaving the areas
of application open. Secondly, the exclusive focus on tyranny as the sole ill to
be avoided is questionable. In the historic context of the European Union, simi-
larly, abuse of centralized powers is not the only risk: local abuse, as experi-
enced under Nazism, and the inability to secure necessary common action are
also threats to individuals. Thus, as Madison pointed out, the plight of minori-
ties is uncertain, since it is unlikely that smaller units are completely homoge-
neous. Indeed, tyranny may emerge more easily in small groups. It might also
be easier for minorities to muster courage in larger settings.
As Jacob Levy observes, “Madison’s argument here combines insight about the
oppressive potential of local homogeneity and local majorities with an unusually
strong endorsement of heterogeneity and plurality in political life.” (Levy, 2015,
p. 203). It is not in the abolition of national power or the suppression of local
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allegiance that oppression is avoided, but in the multiplication of factions that
“make[s] it difficult to assemble a national coalition in favor of any particular
partial interest.” Madison’s is not an argument for subsidiarity, but it is an argu-
ment that recognizes the fruitful tension between local and national power.
This version of subsidiarity with subunits’ veto powers may reduce opportuni-
ties and need for agreement. Montesquieu held that common interest is easier to
see in a smaller setting. We may note that Scharpf (1988) makes similar argu-
ments for subsidiarity in the European Union. Indeed, this narrow conception of
relevant interests may be regarded as a response to such pluralism of world-
views and conceptions of the good life. But such a response could surely be
enhanced by adding to this some further common interests, such as meeting
certain basic needs. Human rights protections might thus also be grounded in this
tradition. After all, perfect homogeneity is never achieved, and “the fewer the
distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the
same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority,
and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plans of oppression” (Madison 1787). These risks
should be kept in mind when considering the implications of Lisbon subsidiar-
ity or Canadian subsidiarity for human rights protections.
(C) EFFICIENCY: ECONOMIC FEDERALISM
This theory of subsidiarity holds that powers and burdens of public goods should
be placed with the populations that benefit from them. Decentralized govern-
ment is to be preferred where targeted provision of public goods is more efficient
in economic terms. Member units do not enjoy veto powers, since free-riding
member units may be overruled to ensure efficient coordination and production
of public goods—namely, non-excludable and inexhaustible goods. One weak-
ness of this view is that it is limited in scope to such public goods. One strength
of this account is that it may help specify the comparative advantage sometimes
provided by central action, as found in Canadian subsidiarity. However,
economic federalism suffers from the standard weaknesses of economic theory
regarded as a theory of normative legitimacy, including ignorance of important
issues of preference formation. Moreover, it relies on Pareto improvements from
given utility levels, ignoring the pervasive impact of unfair starting positions.
Also note that arguments of economic federalism may recommend that issues are
removed from democratic and political control, and instead be placed with
market mechanisms, courts, or other non-political arrangements within subunits.
Of relevance for Lisbon subsidiarity, we may note that this argument questions
the presumption in favour of member states as the appropriate subunits, and may
instead support placing powers with substate regions or even individuals.
Subsidiarity, also on this view, may go all the way down.
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(D) JUSTICE: CATHOLIC PERSONALISM
The Catholic tradition of subsidiarity is expressed clearly in the 1891 Encycli-
cal Rerum Novarum, and further developed in the 1931 Encyclical Quadrages-
imo Anno against fascism. The Catholic Church sought protection against
socialism, yet protested capitalist exploitation of the poor. As developed in
personalism, the human good is to develop and realize one’s potential as made
in the image of God. Voluntary interaction is required to find one’s role and to
promote one’s good. The state must serve the common interest, and intervene to
further individuals’ autonomy.
This version of subsidiarity should regulate both competence allocation and
exercise. It allows both territorial and functional applications of the principle,
possibly placing some issues outside of the scope of democratic politics.
Subunits do not enjoy veto rights, and interpretation of subsidiarity may be
entrusted to the centre unit. Non-intervention into smaller units may often be
appropriate, both to protect individuals’ autonomy—we might think of human
rights—as required for their proper development, and to save the scarce
resources of the state or other larger unit. Conversely, state intervention is legit-
imate and required when the public good is threatened, such as when a particu-
lar class suffers (paras. 36 and 37; Pius XI 1931, para. 78).
This particular conception of subsidiarity rests on contested conceptions of the
social order as willed by God, and of the human good as a particular mode of
human flourishing. It is thus easily subject to the reasonable criticism that it
cannot be applied among parties who fail to share this contested view. Indeed,
the Catholic account of subsidiarity illustrates a broader feature of the princi-
ple—namely, that it presumes a significant amount of agreement about the
common good (religious or not) and about the structures of adjudication of
competencies (ecclesiastical or otherwise). In an organization like the Roman
Catholic Church, in which the different components ostensibly share a common
end and accept a common hierarchy, the jurisdictional problem of which author-
ity ought to make decisions about competency and on what grounds it ought to
make them is already resolved. This jurisdictional problem is prior to the appli-
cation of the principle of subsidiarity, as we have observed several times above,
and this conception of subsidiarity is ill-equipped to solve it (Levy, 2007, p. 459;
Muñiz-Fraticelli, 2014, pp. 64-73).
The principle of subsidiarity cannot settle beyond reasonable disagreement
which subunits and cleavages should be embedded—e.g., the role of families, or
of labour unions. This may be an advantage, in that it makes this theory more
flexible and adaptable to various forms of social organization. However, it does
create problems when this version has strong yet contested views about what
the responsibilities should be—e.g., those of families regarding care for the
infirm and wages or support for the unemployed. Deliberation might reduce
these disagreements for purposes of reaching public consensus. And one might
be able to agree on certain basic human necessities—such as human rights—
which are less open to challenge.
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As long as there is such disagreement about conceptions of the good life, we
should be wary of granting authority to make such decisions about flourishing
to any authorities—be they decentralized or centralized. However, this is
compatible with subunits pooling certain powers to secure objectives they deem
in their interest. Furthermore, human rights treaties that limit state sovereignty
may be more robust against criticism of this kind: these treaties and international
efforts are not clearly aimed at promoting flourishing, but rather largely aimed
at preventing abuse of state power that causes human harms. There is arguably
more—but not full—agreement on such topics than on the details of human
flourishing.
Some of these aspects of the Catholic view are consistent with the Lisbon Treaty
and with Canadian subsidiarity, in that standards and objectives of the social
order are to be taken as given—whether respectively, by God and His Church;
by the treaty and its guardian, the Commission or as stated in the Canadian
Constitution: “Peace, Order and good Government”. Disagreement about such
social functions are not easily managed by means of this conception of subsidiar-
ity. On the other hand, this approach clearly allows challenges concerning the
legitimacy of particular member units or states: The state must comply with
natural and divine law to serve the common interest (John XXIII 1961, para. 20;
Leo XIII 1891). This account also holds that subsidiarity must go all the way
down to the individual—a view that sits less well with those conceptions of
subsidiarity that only apply to the relationship between a state and interstate rela-
tions, as the EU or in Canada.
(E) A LIBERAL CONTRACTUALIST CASE FOR SUBSIDIARITY
Liberal contractualism of the kind associated with Rawls, Scanlon, or Barry
might acknowledge a limited role for subsidiarity. Some but not all of the argu-
ments above find support within this tradition. In addition, two arguments
consistent with this tradition provide some support for subsidiarity. Firstly, indi-
viduals must be acknowledged to have an interest in controlling the social insti-
tutions that in turn shape their values, goals, options, and expectations.6 Such
political influence secures and promotes two important interests. Agreeing with
the Republican claim of confederalists, it protects our interest in avoiding domi-
nation by others (cf. Pettit, 1997). In modern polities, this risk is arguably
reduced by a broad dispersion of procedural control. Control over institutional
change further serves to maintain our legitimate expectations. We have an inter-
est in regulating the speed and direction of institutional change. This interest is
secured by ensuring our informed participation, to reduce the risk of false expec-
tations. When individuals share circumstances, beliefs, or values, they have a
prima facie claim to share control over institutional change to prevent subjection
and breaking of legitimate expectations. Those similarly affected are more likely
to comprehend the need and room for change. Insofar as this holds true of
members of subunits, there is a case for subsidiarity. Such considerations would,
for instance, seem to support various legal powers enjoyed by the Francophone
in Quebec. However, this account does not single out member units in the form
of states as the only relevant subunits, contrary to Lisbon subsidiarity.
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The second argument for subsidiarity concerns its role in character formation.
The principle of subsidiarity can foster and structure political argumentation and
bargaining in ways beneficial to public deliberation, and to the character forma-
tion required to sustain a just political order. By requiring impact statements and
arguments of comparative efficiency, and by allowing member unit parliamen-
tarians an institutional role, Lisbon subsidiarity may facilitate the socialization
of individuals into the requisite sense of justice and concern for the common
good. For this purpose, the principle of subsidiarity need not provide standards
for the resolution of issues, as long as it requires public arguments about the
legitimate status of member units, the proper common goal, and the likely effects
of subunit and centre-unit action. However, this liberal contractualist argument
underdetermines subsidiarity. That is, other rules for the exercise of political
power could serve the same purpose, which is to ensure public debate about
shared ends and suitable means, leading to preference adjustment. Furthermore,
this debate must be supplemented by theories of institutional design in order to
suggest suitable institutional reforms.Whether member units should enjoy veto,
votes, or only voice is a matter of the likely institutional effects on character
formation, and on the likely distributive effects.
SUMMARY: SUBSIDIARITY—IN THE LISBON TREATY, IN CANADA,
AND OTHERWISE
In light of these brief sketches, we may conclude that Lisbon subsidiarity and
Canadian subsidiarity seem to be conceptions of subsidiarity with features that
fit with each of these five theories to varying degrees. The five accounts of
subsidiarity sketched above suggest several reasons to support subsidiarity—
but quite different versions of it.
(a) Member units are better able to secure shared interests, particularly if shared
geography, resources, culture, or other features make for similar interests and
policy choices among members of the subunits.
(b)A reduction of issues on the agenda and parties to agreements serve to reduce
the risk of information overload, and foster joint gains.
(c) The deliberation fostered by subsidiarity can help build community, partly by
preference formation towards the common good. The deliberation about ends
also supports an important sense of community for a minority, that these deci-
sions are ours, and can foster a sense among the majority about majority
constraints. Deliberation may thus enforce the boundary within which majori-
tarianism is accepted as a legitimate decision procedure (cf. Miller, 1995, p. 257;
Manin, 1987, p. 352).
(d) Subsidiarity helps protect against subjection and domination by others, by
proscribing intervention into local affairs except when necessary for certain goals
that are in some intriguing sense shared.
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3. HOWMIGHT TRADITIONS OF SUBSIDIARITY ADD VALUE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DELIBERATIONS IN CANADA?
Tolstoy claimed that while all happy families are alike, the unhappy families are
all different (Tolstoy, 2011). Similarly, each political order with federal elements
is a response to unique situations—often to challenges, but also to special oppor-
tunities. Thus the arrangements of the European Union and Canada are differ-
ent, and lessons may be difficult to draw between them. For instance, insights
concerning risks of fragmentation and centralization may not travel well. The
risks are different depending on the constitutional design: the best mechanisms
are different, since they must reflect history. For instance, are these political
orders the result of independent states ‘coming together’—as in the EU—or are
these prominent features the result, as in Canada, of attempts to accommodate
differences by constitutionally devolving to quell local unrest by reducing the
number of issues that all must agree on?
These differences notwithstanding, traditions of subsidiarity may contribute to
more legitimate and more stable legal orders.
As most federations, the EU and Canada share one challenge: political orders
with federal elements are less stable than unitary states; they have a permanent
risk of undue centralization of power, or of fragmentation (Norman, 2001).
Canada faces such concerns most saliently with regard to the status of Quebec.
The Canadian constitution reduces the risk of untoward centralization or seces-
sion by careful listing the powers of both federal and provincial government
bodies (in sections 91 and 92). However, issues of national concern may warrant
federal action, which may lead to centralization over time. Similarly, the EU
must address the emergence of eurosceptics, whose agendas may diverge but
may well lead to calls for secession or for at least a removal of certain compe-
tences from the EU back to member states.
A principle of subsidiarity—however defined—may serve as a constitutional
stabilizing device for such profound disagreements. It may be used as a mech-
anism to help keep federal arrangements responsive to new challenges, yet main-
tain federal elements over time. One may hope that it can foster dynamic
stability, allowing reasoned change in allocation of competences, avoiding the
perennial risks to federations of undue centralization or fragmentation in the
form of secession. Appeals to subsidiarity may helps structure such ‘constitu-
tional’ debates, and the critique and assessment of allocation of competences.
A related reason to value appeals to subsidiarity is that they may help in the crit-
ical and constructive assessment of calls for central action. Before turning to the
Canadian case, recall that the Lisbon Treaty lays out the following account of
subsidiarity:
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the
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objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level,
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action,
be better achieved at Union level.7
When interpreted strictly, the likelihood of success of union action is irrelevant
for deciding whether union action is permitted: that is only a matter of whether
the objectives (a) cannot be achieved to a sufficient level by member states, and
whether these objectives (b) can be so achieved by the EU. A charitable inter-
pretation is that some plausible assessment of likely success by EU actors is also
required. Consider one example: different member states may give different
priority to various objectives. Thus in the EU, some states may be more
concerned with environment than with other issues. There may then be disagree-
ment about which level of regulation to aim for. Indeed, there may be cases
where an agreed EU level may result in lower standards in some states—and
hence overall worse outcomes—than no common standard at all.
In the case of Canadian subsidiarity, the relevant clause is part of section 91 of
the Constitution Act of 1867.
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate and House of Commons, to make laws for the peace, order,
and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming
within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the provinces.
This and the next section enumerate the powers of federal and provincial
governements, respectively. Thus, the provinces have exclusive power, for
instance, to raise revenues through taxation for provincial purposes, to manage
natural resources, to establish institutions for education and medical care, to
charter corporations “for provincial objects,” and to secure property and civil
rights in the province (Sec. 92). In relation to agriculture or immigration, federal
and provincial powers are concurrent (Sec. 95). The clause cited above concerns
how residual powers should be allocated and used. While the Constitution
allows the federal government to exercise authority in all areas not reserved to
the provinces, this has been understood as legitimizing central action only in
certain cases.
Generally, we see similarities to subsidiarity in Canada when the Supreme Court
attempts to determine the applicability and limits of the federal power to promote
“Peace, Order, and Good Government.” The Supreme Court of Canada has
focused on a doctrine of national concern test for promoting certain specified
objectives. In order to determine whether a matter fell under the federal govern-
ment’s jurisdiction, the Court asked whether the provinces were unable to
address the problem under consideration. In R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada,
the Court outlined the elements of the “national concern doctrine.”
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For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense
it must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of
impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the funda-
mental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution[.]8
Pollution of waterways that cut across provinces is a typical example of such
externalities wrought on other provinces.Another justification for federal action
is when federal rather than provincial action has comparative advantages.
Considerations of subsidiarity may foster systematic discussions about how to
specify these reasons, and possibly add other reasons based on subsidiarity that
may counsel central action consistent with the constitution. Central action is
only permitted in cases where these objectives are at stake, or because decisions
by one province impacts on other provinces to a sufficiently large extent. This
is the basis of the provincial inability test of matters of national concern.
However, the effect of the Court’s reliance of a test of provincial inability to
curb excessive centralization (as one might expect of a principle analogous to
subsidiarity) is at best equivocal, both before and after the Zellerbach decision.9
Eugenie Brouillet observes that
since the 1988 [Zellerbach] decision, this doctrine, although frequently
invoked by the federal government in support of its legislative interven-
tions, has been less frequently used by the Supreme Court, which prefers
to validate its actions on the basis of the listed areas of jurisdiction, even
if it has to extend their scope. (Brouillet, 2011, p. 622, n. 83)
The effect of the national concern doctrine and its provincial inability test has
been, unsurprisingly, to justify further centralization of authority at the federal
level. Brouillet is quick to note the difference between the notion of provincial
inability and the principle of subsidiarity in the European Union. First, while
“the European principle, … only produces its effects in a situation of concurrent
jurisdiction, the Canadian notion can apply with regard to matters that are not
under the jurisdiction of the federal parliament at all.” (Brouillet, 2011, p. 621)
It therefore bypasses the jurisdictional limits characteristic of federations and
works to draw authority ever upwards, rather than towards the federal state or
the provinces, depending on circumstances.
Other doctrines developed by the Supreme Court of Canada to allocate compe-
tencies between the federal and provincial level share features of subsidiarity,
especially the federal power to regulate general trade and commerce.10 Their
application has likewise had a centralizing effect. In the opposite direction, Cana-
dian courts have developed a doctrine of ‘double aspect’ when provincial and
federal legislatures may simultaneously legislate on the same subject matter.
The Supreme Court has not been clear on the principles to apply in such cases,
although, Hogg suggests, it has cautioned judicial restraint (Hogg, 2015).
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The discussion above prompts several questions.Who has the authority to deter-
mine the requisite “Order and Good Government,” and is this allocation wise for
purposes of avoiding centralization? Is this for the provinces to decide, possibly
yielding profound disagreement and thus inaction? Or is it for the federal govern-
ment, at the risk of imposing one contested conception of these concerns against
others? Likewise, who has and should have authority to decide what counts as
externalities—that is, costs borne by other provinces? What counts as such costs
is in part determined by which objectives are recognized as legitimate. Consider
a hypothetical case where one province creates an interprovincial competition by
means of more attractive regulations. Lower tax rates or laxer protection of
workers entice businesses to establish themselves there, but this results in lower
redistributive services to the distraught. Other provinces or their citizens may
charge that this competition induces a race to the bottom. For them this is a nega-
tive externality, but the province that lowers its tax rate may disagree insofar as
it rejects redistribution as an objective.
With regard to the comparative advantage of central action, the overview of
theories of subsidiarity reminds us that economies of scale may counsel central-
ization in some cases—while local clusters of policy preferences may do the
reverse. However, it will often be contested whether the provinces or the federal
level has comparative advantage in securing the requisite goals, not least with
regard to cost effectiveness. One example from the EU may be environmental
protection, which may be secured to a higher degree in some member states such
as Germany, than in an EU-wide regulation.Again, a central issue is who has the
authority to decide whether central action is better—and whether member units
should have veto power.
These issues that come into focus when we explore alternative theories of
subsidiary are grounds to consider central action other than in terms of inability
and comparative advantage. In particular, important questions arise when one
member unit fails to promote certain objectives not out of inability, but out of
unwillingness. In principle, human rights violations may be of such kind.
Depending on one’s choice of conception of subsidiarity, such a member unit
should be able to enjoy immunity, or to veto common action—or find itself
defeated by a majority in the federal government.
4. LIMITS TO THE VALUE OF A PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY: NOT A
PANACEA.
The benefits of attending to subsidiarity arguments should not be overdrawn,
for several crucial contested issues are not resolved by a generally acceptable
principle. One such issue involves the consideration of human rights concerns
when attempting to justify and structure the political order itself. These founda-
tional questions demonstrate the limits of the principle of subsidiarity, and
suggest either that human rights concerns may need to be directly specified by
other principles, or that subsidiarity itself must be interpreted as going ‘all the
way down’ to the individual, either in the sense that it is justified only insofar as
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it serves individuals’ interests, or because it recognizes individuals as the ulti-
mate arbiters of these interests.
‘The’ Principle of Subsidiarity cannot on its own provide legitimacy or
contribute to a defensible structuring of a political order with federal elements,
or of human rights law.As indicated above, appeals to subsidiarity are too vague,
and require attention to several items—including who should decide the objec-
tives of central action, and whether central action is prohibited or required. We
submit that more plausible versions of subsidiarity insist that, ultimately, these
questions are answered in light of the arrangements that benefit individual
persons’ interests better than the alternatives. Neither subsidiarity nor sovereign
states are obvious solutions.
With regard to the risks of undue centralization that federations face, we should
also recall that appeals to subsidiaritymay be used to defend more central action.
Subsidiarity may promote centralization unduly if the central authorities can
determine objectives contrary to the preferences of member units and override
their protests. Some critics of subsidiarity in the European context have argued
precisely that “instead of providing a method to balance between Member State
and Community interests, [subsidiarity] assumes the Community goals, privi-
leges their achievement absolutely, and simply asks who should be the one to do
the implementing work.” (Davies, 2006, p. 67)
Finally, consider more fully the problems for conceptions of subsidiarity that
arise in a multilevel setting with regard to human rights protection. Subsidiarity
considerations do not automatically protect individuals from ’local’ domination,
incompetence, or tyranny—unless that is specified as an objective of the federal
order, e.g., as a commitment to protect human rights. This is one reason why
many hold that a principle of subsidiarity must be supplemented with human
rights protection against the subunit authorities. But such a supplement does not
sit well with all of the conceptions of subsidiarity that stress the autonomy of
member units. In ‘coming together’ federations, treaties typically agreed to
favour the interests of states, without due regard to the impact on individuals
within or without their borders. This is not to deny that treaties may well bene-
fit individuals, insofar as a sufficient number of these states happen to be demo-
cratic or otherwise responsive to the interests of their citizens. But arrangements
that benefit individuals to the disadvantage of states can thus not be expected,
and such arrangements are not likely to give the interests of individuals sufficient
weight against other interests of states or of their governments. In the EU, this
weakness is avoided by insisting that all member states are subject to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, and by various human rights conditions
included in the EU treaties.
For ‘holding together’ federations, there is similarly no mechanism that ensures
that the member units’ autonomy is constrained by human rights protections
maintained by the central authorities. In the Canadian setting, such tensions are
addressed quite clearly, not least with the 1982 Canadian Charter on Rights and
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Freedoms (Part 1). Thus, central authorities may seek to protect also good gover-
nance within member units. Some tensions remain, as in connection with
conflicts between the rights of minority cultures and egalitarian citizenship
rights, leading some to ask whether multiculturalism is good for women (Cohen,
1999).
In both these kinds of (quasi)federations, central courts may provide helpful
services in protecting individuals from abuse by their member unit authorities.
Important contested issues remain, especially in states that have long traditions
of largely sufficient domestic human rights protection. They may ask, as the UK
and other states in Europe now do, sometimes with appeals to subsidiarity: by
what right should centralized courts with mixed credentials be permitted to over-
ride domestic legislation as incompatible with human rights standards? Again,
the normatively best response may require attention to details such as what
power such a central court should have—to overturn legislation or only to urge
national legislatures to reconsider—and whether such courts should be more
lenient toward member units that are generally more compliant with human
rights. Some such suggestions will again be favoured by considerations of
subsidiarity—but only if subsidiarity goes all the way down to the individual.
That is, subsidiarity may be compatible with, and indeed supportive of, multi-
level human rights protections including judicial review. But the justifiable prin-
ciples of subsidiarity must insist that the ultimate standard of justification of the
allocation of political authority is not whether it serves the interests of member
units, but whether such a legal and political order serves the best interests of
individuals.
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NOTES
1 See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 and General Motors Canada v. City
National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641. We owe much of the Canadian discussion to Hogg,
1993.
2 E.g., 114957 Canada v. Hudson [2001] 2. S.C.R. 241, par. 3 [whether municipal legislation
allowed a municipality to pass a bylaw restricting pesticide use]; Canada Western Bank v.
Alta. [2007] 2.S.C.R. 3 para. 45 [whether inter-jurisdictional immunity, by limiting provincial
but not federal powers, undermines the principles (sic) of subsidiarity]; Re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 [whether parliament had authority under criminal law
power to regulate assisted human reproduction]; discussed in Brouillet, 2011.
3 For the origins of the typology, see Stepan, 1999.
4 European Council, “Treaty of LisbonAmending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007,” Official Jour-
nal of the European Union, vol. 50, no. 2007/C 306/01, 2007, Art 5.3.
5 A fuller explanation of these traditions of subsidiarity is given in Follesdal, 1998.
6 On a more local level, we may also consider Rawls’s insistence that “the principles of justice
are related to human sociability” and that the social bases of self respect (the most important
of the primary goods) develop especially in social unions, settings in which “shared final ends
and common activities valued for themselves” are collectively pursued by like-minded indi-
viduals within a larger social setting. Rawls, 1999, pp. 460-462.
7 European Council, “Treaty of LisbonAmending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007,” op. cit, (our
emphasis).
8 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, par. 33.
9 A clear early example is the creation and regulation of federally chartered corporations. Under
the Constitution Act of 1867, provinces have power over the “incorporation of Companies
with Provincial Objects” (Sec. 92(11)). No such power is granted to the federal government,
except for the incorporation of banks. Yet in Citizens’ and The Queen Insurance Cos. v.
Parsons, 1881, 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.), the Privy Council—which was then the final court of
appeal in Canada—found the power to incorporate companies at the national level to be
implicit in the Peace, Order, and good Government clause. Inversely, in Bonanza Creek Gold
Mining Co. Ltd. v. R. [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C) the Privy Council interpreted this clause
narrowly to say that “[a] province is not capable of endowing a corporation the capacity to
carry on business in other jurisdictions, but will be able to do so only if it obtains the permis-
sion from the other jurisdiction.” Provinces may still regulate federal corporations (as when
they regulate business generally), but only if this regulation does not “affect some essential
aspect of a federal corporation.” See VanDuzer, 2003, p. 86ff.
10 See General Motors of Canada v. City National Leasing, [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989].
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